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Abstract: 
 
Explanatory pluralism is the view that the best form and level of explanation 
depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation, and 
that in order to answer all questions in the best way possible, we need more 
than one form and level of explanation. In the first part of this article, we argue 
that explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences, at least in theory. 
However, in the second part of the article we show that medical research and 
practice is actually not fully and truly explanatory pluralist yet. Although the 
literature demonstrates a slowly growing interest in non-reductive explanations 
in medicine, the dominant approach in medicine is still methodologically 
reductionist. This implies that non-reductive explanations often do not get the 
attention they deserve. We argue that the field of medicine could benefit 
greatly by reconsidering its reductive tendencies and becoming fully and truly 
explanatory pluralist. Nonetheless, trying to achieve the right balance in the 
search for and application of reductive and non-reductive explanations will in 
any case be a difficult exercise.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Ever since the advent of a mechanistic worldview, science has made important 
progress. Medicine has also benefited greatly from the growth in knowledge 
brought about by applying the new approach to human beings. This has led to 
ever increasing insights into ever smaller parts of the human body that can be 
intervened on to improve people’s health. This progress has also resulted in the 
increasing impact on medical theorizing of reductionism, the “chief 
metaphysical presupposition of biomedicine” [1, p. 395].  
 
Different kinds of reductionism should be discerned. In this article, we 
will focus on what James Marcum calls “methodological reductionism” [2, pp. 
24-25]. A methodological reductionist argues that efficient research should 
dissect higher order phenomena into their constitutive components at the lower 
order. In other words, a methodological reductionist sees component-centered 
social science, psychology, biology, biomedical science, etc. as the most 
effective way of doing research. Methodological reductionism should be 
distinguished from ontological reductionism. For the ontological reductionist, 
the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interactions. 
Therefore, everything needs to be explained in terms of the laws of physics. In 
what follows, we will put reductive metaphysics between brackets (i.e., we do 
not presume that ontological reductionism is true, nor that it is false) and, 
instead, discuss the pragmatic value of explanations at different levels in the 
medical sciences.  
 
The dominant approach to explanation in medicine is methodological 
reductionism, which claims that diseases should always be explained by 
reference to the constitutive components of their bearers. There are three 
possible alternatives to this view. The first is methodological holism—the view 
that a complete explanation in medicine should always take non-reductive 
explanatory factors into account (factors that do not refer to components), 
together with reductive ones (factors that do refer to components). The second is 
methodological non-reductionism—the view that medical phenomena should 
always be explained by reference to non-reductive explanatory factors only 
(leaving out reductive factors)1. The third alternative is methodological 
explanatory pluralism—the view that the best form and level of explanation 
depends on the kind of question one seeks to answer by the explanation and that 
one needs more than one form and level of explanation to answer all questions 
in the best way possible. 
 
                                                
1 The term “non-reductionism” gets different interpretations in the philosophical literature. However, we do not 
want to refer to the extensive philosophical debates on non-reductionism (and/or anti-reductionism) but will use 
the label “methodological non-reductionism” throughout the paper strictly as defined here.  
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Sections 2 and 3 form the first part of this paper. In section 2, we discern 
different kinds of explanation in medicine by way of two examples (skin cancer 
and lung cancer), which we further use in section 3 to show that, in theory, 
explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences. In the remaining sections, 
we focus on the situation in practice and explore to what extent methodological 
explanatory pluralism is actually a fact in medicine today. In section 4, we argue 
that medicine is moving in the right direction but is not fully and truly 
explanatory pluralist yet. In section 5, we show that the medical literature 
indirectly provides arguments for explanatory pluralism by drawing attention to 
epistemic interests calling for reductive explanations as well as to epistemic 
interests calling for non-reductive explanations. Section 6 illustrates two 
important forms of reduction in contemporary medicine, namely, 
biochemicalization and geneticization, by way of two case studies (ADHD and 
Alzheimer’s disease). We further use these examples to claim that medicine 
should consider whether the great emphasis on reductive explanatory factors is 
justified in view of what could potentially be gained from an explanatory 
pluralist approach.  
 
2. Macro-explanations, micro-explanations, and reductive explanations in the 
medical sciences.  
 
In this article, we distinguish between reductive explanations and non-reductive 
explanations in the medical sciences. More specifically, we discern three kinds of 
explanation: non-reductive macro-explanations, non-reductive micro-explanations, 
and reductive micro-explanations. Thus, non-reductive explanations are of two 
kinds: macro- and micro-explanations. In contrast, reductive explanations are a 
kind of micro-explanation in which one additionally refers to properties that 
require decomposition.  
 
Let us look at an example to clarify this. Suppose we want to explain a 
higher incidence of skin cancer in a group of Belgians spending their summer 
holidays each year in the Mediterranean, compared with a group of Belgians 
staying in Belgium during summer holidays. In this case, we can explain the 
difference in the incidence of skin cancer by referring to a higher exposure to sun 
rays in the group of people going on holiday in the Mediterranean. This would 
form a macro-explanation. In macro-explanations, we refer to a property that a 
whole population has in common and that is external to the individuals in the 
group. In other words, it concerns characteristics of a group as a whole, which 
individuals leaving the group and joining the other group will no longer possess.2  
                                                
2 One might, for example, think that the genetic make-up of Asians compared to those of Europeans is a group 
characteristic, and hence, one that can act as a macro explanatory factor. However, if an Asian moves to Europe 
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However, if we want to explain differences in the development of skin 
cancer within the group of people exposed to a higher amount of sun rays each 
year, we can, for example, refer to the fact that some of these people have a habit 
of protecting themselves using suntan lotion while others do not. Such an 
explanation, referring to differences among individuals within a group, is a micro-
explanation.3 If a micro-explanation, as in this case, refers to behavior, lifestyle, 
habits, etc., then it concerns a non-reductive micro-explanation.  
 
However, we might also want to explain why some of the Belgians 
spending their holidays in the Mediterranean still develop skin cancer despite 
using suntan lotion to protect their skin. In that case, a possible explanation would 
be that genetic differences between people make some people more susceptible 
than others to risk factors such as excessive exposure to sun rays. In this case, we 
refer again to differences between individuals in a group and hence use a micro-
explanation. However, the properties referred to (genes) require parsing an 
individual in terms of his or her biologic make-up rather than externally 
observable characteristics and behaviors. We call explanations referring to such 
categories reductive explanations.  
 
Let us look at a second example, namely, the search for explanations of lung 
cancer. Clearly, the most straightforward explanation of lung cancer refers to 
one’s individual lifestyle, most commonly, the habit of smoking. This 
explanation focuses on the most important risk factor of lung cancer at the non-
reductive micro-level. However, other possible non-reductive micro-
explanations are left aside when focusing on smoking habits only. For example, 
people who lead a stressful life or get nervous easily might be more likely to 
start and/or continue smoking, thus becoming more susceptible to lung cancer. 
Such explanatory factors would also be of the micro-, non-reductive kind. 
However, none of these factors can explain why, for example, some smokers 
develop lung cancer while others do not. To explain this, reference to the role of 
“lung cancer genes” can be made. In 2008, three research teams reported the 
identification of specific gene variants that would make some smokers more 
susceptible to lung cancer than others [3-6]. These findings offer information 
that could figure in a reductive explanation of lung cancer. Lastly, we can also 
explain certain differences in the incidence of lung cancer between two groups 
of people by reference to, for instance, differences in the social acceptance of 
smoking behavior, differences in advertising policies, or differences in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
and takes a European nationality, he will still have the same genetic make-up. For this reason, reference to one’s 
genetic make-up in an explanation makes for a reductive explanation, as we will further explain.  
3 Non-reductive micro-explanations can sometimes easily be translated to the macro-level and the reverse. This 
depends on whether one focuses, for example, on unhealthy individual lifestyle choices or, rather, on the 
environmental factors that lead to these unhealthy lifestyles. This does not pose any problems because we can 
use the term “non-reductive explanation,” which covers both types.  
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economic situation of their countries. These explanations would all be situated at 
the macro level. What all the above explanations have in common is that they 
explain lung cancer in one way or another. Nonetheless, they are all of a 
different kind.   
 
 
3. Explanatory pluralism in the medical sciences: Elaboration and defense. 
 
As already mentioned, methodological explanatory pluralism consists in 
the claim that the best form and level of explanation depends on the kind of 
question one seeks to answer by the explanation and that in order to answer all 
questions in the best way possible, one needs more than one form and level of 
explanation. Suppose we wonder why x has property P at time t. Different, more 
specific questions—motivated by different epistemic interests—can underlie this 
general explanation-seeking question, even if all questions are assumed to be 
requests for causal explanations. For instance, why does x have property P, 
rather than the more desirable property P’? Is the fact that x has property P the 
predictable consequence of some other events? Is the fact that x has property P 
caused by a familiar pattern or causal mechanism? According to explanatory 
pluralism, these questions have different answers. Which answer provides the 
most adequate, efficient, and accurate explanatory information depends on the 
specific question one wants to answer (or, in other words, on the specific 
information that is requested in view of the explanatory purposes).4 Hence, 
making the specific question as explicit as possible is important for explanatory 
success. This account of explanatory pluralism makes use of the erotetic model of 
explanation developed by Bas Van Fraassen. He introduced the concept of 
relevance relation in order to deal with the fact that “verbally the same why-
questions may be a request for different types of explanatory factors” [8, p. 131].  
His example (an adapted version of an example given by Aristotle in his Posterior 
Analytics) is the following: 
 
Suppose a father asks his teenage son, “Why is the porch light on?” and the 
son replies “The porch switch is closed and the electricity is reaching the 
bulb through that switch.”  At this point you are most likely to feel that the 
son is being impudent. This is because you are most likely to think that the 
sort of answer the father needed was something like: “Because we are 
expecting company.” But it is easy to imagine a less likely question context: 
the father and the son are re-wiring the house and the father, unexpectedly 
seeing the porch light on, fears that he has caused a short circuit that 
bypasses the porch light switch. In the second case, he is not interested in 
                                                
4 The adequacy, efficiency, and accuracy of explanations are elaborated in Van Bouwel and Weber [7]. 
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the human expectations or desires that led to the depressing of the switch. 
[8, p. 131] 
 
This passage shows the importance of making explanatory requests, i.e., 
explanation-seeking why-questions, as explicit as possible since different 
epistemic interests might be motivating a seemingly similar explanatory request. 
 
 In earlier research, arguments have been developed in favor of 
explanatory pluralism in history, psychology, and the social sciences. It has been 
argued that the explanatory practices of scientists in these disciplines show how 
different epistemic interests might lead them to choose different forms of 
explanation at different levels.5 Among the different epistemic motivations for 
providing an explanation, we encounter therapeutic and remedial motivations, 
prediction, straightforward curiosity, and explanations for the unexpected. In this 
article, we want to examine how this plays out in medicine. In arguing for 
explanatory pluralism, we will primarily focus on the role of different levels to 
which explanations in medicine refer.6  
 
Let us look again at the lung cancer example. In this case, the rudimentary 
explanation-seeking question is, why did person P develop lung cancer? This 
formulation allows for many relevance relations. More specific formulations 
would be: 
 
(a) Why did person P, who smokes, develop lung cancer, while person P’, 
who also smokes, did not? 
(b) Why did person P with behavior B develop lung cancer, while person 
P’ with behavior B’ did not?  
(c) Why did person P living in country C develop lung cancer, while 
person P’ in country C’ did not? 
 
As we mentioned in the previous section, a straightforward explanation of lung 
cancer refers to one’s individual lifestyle, namely, the habit of smoking. This 
explanation in fact answers the more specific question (b). That smoking causes 
lung cancer has been an established fact for decades. For our epistemic interest 
in the prevention of lung cancer at the individual level, this explanation is 
clearly useful. However, other explanations are also useful in view of other more 
specific questions. For example, the knowledge of lung cancer gene variants, 
                                                
5 See Vanderbeeken and Weber [9], and Weber and Vanderbeeken [10] for a defense of explanatory pluralism in 
psychology. For explanatory pluralism in history and the social sciences, see Weber and Van Bouwel [11], Van 
Bouwel and Weber [7, 12], and Van Bouwel [13]. 
6 Although different levels of explanation might be connected to the use of diverse forms of explanation-seeking 
questions, we will not focus on forms in this paper but rather on levels. 
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figuring in a possible answer to question (a), is supposed to meet the epistemic 
interests of curiosity to know and individual prevention:  
 
The new results allow researchers to construct a better picture of how 
cigarette smoking affects the body, and how the active agents in cigarettes, 
including nicotine, alter the normal growth and development of cells in the 
lung. That could lead to improved and individualized smoking-cessation 
drugs and programs, which are currently successful only 25% of the time. 
[3] 
 
Nonetheless, an explanation at the genetic level does not deliver adequate and 
efficient information in view of the epistemic interest of public health policy. 
For this purpose, macro-explanations answering questions like question (c) are 
probably most adequate.  
 
This lung cancer example demonstrates that researchers and practitioners 
cannot freely select one or the other of the more specific questions to answer the 
rudimentary question. Instead, something needs to guide them toward their 
choice. Good scientists think thoroughly about what kind of information they 
need, and which of the possible more specific explanation-seeking questions 
will deliver the most adequate, accurate, and efficient explanation in view of 
their needs. Different epistemic interests will guide medical researchers and 
practitioners to different kinds of explanation-seeking questions and thus to 
different kinds of explanations in different explanatory contexts. This means 
that, in theory, explanatory pluralism holds for the medical sciences.  
 
The lung cancer example also constitutes an argument against 
methodological reductionism on the condition that (1) questions (b) and (c) cannot 
adequately be answered by a reductive explanation and (2) that these questions are 
legitimate. That the first condition is satisfied was argued above and in the 
previous section. But what about the legitimacy of the questions?  Let us put it this 
way: exclusively focusing on one kind of question at the expense of others might 
have disastrous consequences. This is, for example, demonstrated by Pearce’s 
arguments with respect to tobacco smoking as a cause of disease: 
 
It is one thing to discover that tobacco smoke is the major cause of lung 
cancer, but redressing this situation is a different problem entirely.... 
Moreover, it can be argued that the fundamental problem of tobacco lies in 
its production rather than in its consumption. The limited success of 
legislative measures in industrialized countries has led the tobacco industry 
to shift its promotional activities to developing countries, so that more 
people are exposed to tobacco smoke than ever before.... [W]hen a public 
health problem is studied in individual terms (e.g., tobacco smoking) rather 
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than in population terms (e.g., tobacco production, advertising, and 
distribution, and the social and economic influences on consumption), then 
it is very likely that the solution will also be defined in individual terms and 
the resulting public health action will merely move the problem rather than 
solve it. [14, p. 680] 
 
Let us recapitulate. We have an argument against methodological 
reductionism, but methodological non-reductionism and methodological holism 
still stand as theoretically possible rivals for methodological explanatory 
pluralism. However, our examples can also be used in an argument against 
methodological non-reductionism: a methodological non-reductionist must 
reject the legitimacy of questions like, why did person P, who smokes, develop 
lung cancer, while person P’, who also smokes, did not? and why do some 
people who protect themselves with suntan lotion nevertheless get cancer of the 
skin? Such questions are nonetheless legitimate scientific questions in view of 
our quest for knowledge and the prevention and treatment measures that might 
follow from such knowledge, as we argued above. Hence, here again, we would 
end up in a situation where focusing on one kind of question at the expense of 
others would have disastrous consequences. History has proven that reductive 
explanations are often very useful in view of preventive measures and treatment 
decisions in medicine.7 Without all this knowledge, medicine would not have been 
so powerful in preventing and treating diseases as it is today.  
 
What about methodological holism? This view overlooks an important 
point about explanation, namely, that general questions like, why did person P 
develop lung cancer? are too vague to be answered, while more specific 
questions usually require only one type of explanatory factor. Always focusing 
on the whole, irrespective of one’s precise epistemic aims and needs in a given 
context, would—if even possible—unnecessarily complicate matters and even 
paralyze medical research and decision-making. In other words, methodological 
holists do not offer an efficient alternative for an explanatory pluralist approach.   
 
The account of explanatory pluralism developed here differs from other 
accounts of pluralism in the literature. A prominent one is Sandra Mitchell’s 
[15,16]. Unlike our approach, Mitchell claims that the integration of the 
different levels (population, individual, genetic make-up, etc.) is always a 
necessary condition in providing a satisfactory explanation: “The ‘levels of 
analysis’ framework describes the territory of pluralistic investigations, but it is 
only by integration of the multiple levels and multiple causes, including 
attention to the diverse contexts in which they occur, that satisfactory 
explanations can be generated” [15, p. S78]. Mitchell does not take into account 
                                                
7 We will further discuss arguments for the usefulness of reductive explanations in section 5. 
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the efficiency criterion and her account of pluralism ends up defending 
“satisfactory” explanations that are far too cumbersome, less efficient, and less 
adequate than possible alternative explanations (defended by our account). 
Philosophical views on the explanation of complex biological systems such as 
Carl Craver’s [17, 18] also fail to account for the pragmatics that underlie the 
search for diverse explanatory factors. These theories often allow for the 
explanatory relevance of different organizational levels. In this sense, they are 
compatible with our view. However, they do not aim at accounting for the 
necessity and usefulness of explanatory pluralism for scientific practice, which 
is precisely what we argue for.  
 
 
4. Explanatory pluralism and actual medical research and practice. 
 
In the previous sections, we defended explanatory pluralism in medicine from a 
theoretical point of view. In what follows, we will focus on the situation in 
practice. Our leading question is, “to what extent is methodological explanatory 
pluralism a fact in medicine today?” Looking at the situation in practice will not 
only put flesh on the theoretical bones, but will also force us to recognize that, in 
practice, medical science is moving in the right direction, but is not fully and truly 
explanatory pluralist yet.  
 
As Marcum argues, medical knowledge is traditionally expressed in terms 
of mechanistic or bottom-up causation, focusing on the diseased body (parts) and 
trying to identify the physical causes or entities and processes that are responsible 
for the onset of a disease [1, p. 396]. Consequently, the preferred treatments are 
often based on chemical or physical interventions on these lower-level 
mechanisms by means of drugs or surgery. Hence, the traditional and dominant 
biomedical model relies on a reductive presupposition, as a result of which 
reductive explanations attract all the attention within this approach. Marcum is 
not the only one emphasizing the dominant role of the reductionist biomedical 
model in medicine. Many papers describe the historical evolution through which 
the biomedical model became dominant, and influenced even those domains of 
medicine that were originally concerned with higher-level explanations of 
disease.8 
 
However, after a long reign of a strict biomedical approach in Western 
medicine, recent decades have seen an increasing number of calls for a wider 
perspective on human health and disease, opening up our minds for the 
significance of higher-level explanatory factors. The attention to non-reductive 
factors as causes of disease has started to rise because of the growing attention to 
                                                
8 See, e.g., [14, 19, 20]. 
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chronic rather than infectious diseases over the course of the twentieth century.  
Among them also are some diseases for which the underlying pathology remains 
unclear, such as chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, unexplained chronic 
pain, irritable bowel syndrome, etc. Different holistic approaches plead for more 
attention to both non-reductive micro-explanations (the psychological explanatory 
factors for disease) and macro-explanations (the social, cultural, and 
environmental explanatory factors for disease).  
 
The best-known alternative to the biomedical model is the biopsychosocial 
model, introduced by George Engel in 1950. Engel argued that human suffering, 
disease, and illness should be understood as the product of multiple levels of 
organization, from the societal to the molecular. In other words, one can only 
adequately understand and respond to human suffering if it is understood in terms 
of its biological, psychological, and social dimensions. He criticized the dualistic 
nature of the biomedical model and the excessively materialistic and reductive 
orientation of medical thinking. He argued that although mental and social 
phenomena depend on more basic physical phenomena, they cannot necessarily be 
explained by them. Engel’s new perspective gave great impetus to research 
seeking to elucidate psychological and/or social causes of disease as well as their 
interaction with biological factors [21]. For example, health psychology [22], 
medical sociology, and sociological epidemiology [23-24] became increasingly 
important domains for research into the psychological and social causes of health 
and illness, respectively. 
 
However, the biopsychosocial model has also been criticized for continuing 
to compartmentalize the patient, such that physicians address the biomedical 
symptoms separately from the psychologists and psychiatrists who address the 
psychosocial elements. This led to the development of integrative models, which 
promoted an even more holistic approach to medical problems [25]. Indeed, as 
Diez Roux [26] argues, models for the integration of social factors have evolved 
from viewing social factors as antecedents to biological processes, to viewing 
them as modifiers of biological effects, and then to viewing them as an integral 
part of the causal pathways leading to disease. The former step in this evolution 
can be illustrated by the development of genetic determinism into an approach in 
terms of gene-environment interactions [27-29]. The latter can be illustrated by the 
development of the systems approach [26, 30].  
 
The turn of attention toward non-reductive explanatory factors of health and 
disease is also clear in the late history of epidemiology, which is precisely the 
branch of medicine that focuses on the search for causes of and risk factors for the 
onset of disease. Whereas epidemiology traditionally focused on the causes of 
disease and health at the population level, it turned toward risk factor 
epidemiology in the previous century, focusing increasingly on the individual 
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level. However, this evolution has often been criticized in the last two decades and 
calls have been launched for redirecting the field towards the population-level—by 
including societal and ecological factors in the analyses:  
 
Epidemiology has largely ceased to function as part of a multidisciplinary 
approach to understanding the causation of disease in populations and has 
become a set of generic methods for measuring associations of exposure and 
disease in individuals. This reductive approach focuses on the individual, 
blames the victim, and produces interventions that can be harmful. We seem 
to be using more and more advanced technology to study more and more 
trivial issues, while the major causes of disease are ignored. Epidemiology 
must reintegrate itself into public health and must rediscover the population 
perspective. [14, p. 678]9 
 
Many case studies that try to establish the benefits of attending to psychological, 
social, cultural, ecological and/or environmental points of view in tackling certain 
specific diseases can be found in the recent medical literature.10   
 
In a period of change, medicine is searching for the right mindset with 
which to approach medical problems in research and practice. The general 
impression one gets from the above survey is that medicine is moving in the right 
direction: away from methodological reductionism and toward a more pluralist 
approach. The advantage of this recent tendency is that non-reductive explanations 
are defended as important in addition to reductive explanations, unlike 
methodological reductionism, which defends reductive explanations at the expense 
of other kinds of explanations. In other words, methodological non-reductionism is 
not actually defended in the medical literature. Some of the pluralist approaches, 
nonetheless, tend to the other extreme, namely, a methodologically holistic 
approach, arguing that the most effective way of doing research and of reasoning 
in medicine always takes the whole range of explanatory factors into account. 
Although it is important to think about the big picture once in a while, a 
methodologically holistic approach does not seem feasible in specific research and 
practice contexts.11 Medicine further does not need an “overall approach” in which 
one always considers the same kinds of explanatory factors (always reductive 
explanations, or always non-reductive explanations, or always the whole picture). 
In writing this article, we want to propose an alternative approach that does not 
lapse into extremes, but adopts a middle course that combines the advantages of 
different approaches in a flexible and context-sensitive whole. We argue that the 
best way for medicine to be in the future is not reductionist, nor holist, but 
                                                
9 see also [26, 31-34] 
10 see, e.g., Fee and Krieger [35] with respect to AIDS, Smith and Ruiz [36] with respect to Coronary Heart 
Disease, Vinetz et al. [37] with respect to Leptospirosis, and Chaufan [29] with respect to Diabetes type 2. 
11 S. Nassir Ghaemi, for example, nicely describes in his recent book how the methodologically holistic stance of 
the biopsychosocial model made the approach unfeasible in practice by being too general and too vague [38]. 
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explanatory pluralist. We think that an explanatory pluralist approach provides a 
useful, pragmatic answer to the current reductionism versus holism debate in 
medicine. An explanatory pluralist approach has the potential to reduce the 
controversy and, meanwhile, to remove the blinders imposed by a one-sided 
approach. Medical literature underpins this indirectly by drawing attention both to 
epistemic interests that call for reductive explanations and to epistemic interests 
that call for non-reductive explanations.  
 
5. Epistemic interests in medicine support non-reductive and reductive 
explanations.  
 
We clearly do not support a methodologically holistic approach. 
Nonetheless, the shift of attention towards holism in medicine has played a 
significant role in drawing attention to non-reductive explanations, and the 
arguments for holism include arguments for the pragmatic value of non-reductive 
explanations that we are endorsing. These are some of the recurring arguments for 
searching for and applying non-reductive explanations: they are necessary for a 
more complete understanding of the causation of human disease; they can lead to 
long-term rather than short-term solutions; they can lead to more efficient 
strategies for the prevention of disease at the population/policy level; they provide 
whole societies with help rather than only those individuals that are able to afford 
healthcare; they can lead to a general improvement of people’s health rather than 
tackling each single health problem separately when it arises; they can lead to 
spectacular reductions in the society’s costs for healthcare. In general, the leading 
epistemic interest for the implementation of non-reductive explanations in research 
and practice is effective prevention12 of disease at the macro-level.  
 
There are also cogent pragmatic epistemic values that drive us to the 
search for reductive explanations in scientific practice. One is simplicity: why 
complicate matters if the biomedical approach has shown its usefulness for the 
advancement of medicine? Reductive explanatory factors are often thoroughly 
understood and make up a consistent body of knowledge on the development of 
diseases, but with higher-level explanatory factors, it is often much less clear 
precisely how they influence disease processes. This brings us to a second, and 
probably the most important, pragmatic epistemic value: the reductive approach 
leads to quick fixes, unlike the non-reductive one. In other words, it often 
enables intervention in terms of an easy and efficient treatment, and hence, 
instant care for diseased individuals. A third pragmatic epistemic value is that 
these are also very useful for diagnosis, which is clearly an important goal of 
                                                
12 Although prevention and treatment can be interpreted as two forms of the broader epistemic interest of 
intervention/manipulation, the usefulness of distinguishing between the two in the context of medicine will 
become clear from what follows.  In medical research, each of these epistemic interests may indeed lead to a 
different approach to the same research topic, possibly even focusing on different levels of explanation and, 
consequently, intervention. 
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practicing doctors. Furthermore, the ability to predict disease development and 
disease progress at an individual level (sometimes as a means to timely 
intervention) drives medicine toward reductionism. A final epistemic value is, of 
course, simple curiosity about how the human body develops disease.  
 
Notwithstanding the growing attention to non-reductive explanations, 
methodological reductionism is still dominant in medicine. A reductive approach 
is often seen as a straightforward choice, even though this should not be the case. 
The epistemic interests leading to reductive explanation-seeking questions seem to 
play an important role in the ongoing dominance of reductionism in medicine.  In 
the next section, we will illustrate this by discussing in more detail two familiar 
forms of reductionism in the biomedical sciences in relation to certain diseases, 
the first being biochemicalization with respect to ADHD, and the second being 
geneticization with respect to Alzheimer’s disease. In addition, we will 
demonstrate what medicine can gain by an explanatory pluralist approach in these 
cases.  
 
6. Two case studies 
 
Drugging deficits 
 
Probably the most important form of reduction in the biomedical sciences can be 
labeled biochemicalization13. Following a biochemical reduction, the 
explanation of diseases or “inappropriate” behavior invokes a pharmacological 
response (chemicals are used to influence the biochemical processes in the 
human body), rather than a social or psychological remedy. This approach has 
proven its usefulness in treating many diseases and is therefore often hardly 
questioned. However, the choice to biochemicalize the explanations for some 
diseases and to pharmacologize their treatments cannot be considered self-
evident but should be a matter of well-considered interests and related 
explanation-seeking questions. One example of such a disease is Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).   
 
The medical world clearly prefers to treat children suffering from ADHD 
with methylphenidate (MPH)—with apparent success—rather than supporting 
pedagogical remedies, such as different teaching techniques, or advocating 
preventive measures, such as avoidance of smoking, alcohol, and drugs during 
pregnancy. Although ADHD is diagnosed on the basis of the apparent deviant 
behavior of children as described by the DSM-IV criteria, the currently 
predominant scientific model of ADHD locates the origins of the disease in 
neurobiological dysfunctions [39]. Pharmacological treatment is considered an 
                                                
13 The most debatable form of which is neurobiochemicalization, where biochemical processes in the brain are 
influenced by means of a pharmacological intervention. 
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effective means to influence the undesired effects of the neurobiological deficits 
involved in ADHD. Consequently, medication treatment rates are increasing 
rapidly [40]. Nevertheless, neither the precise neurobiological pathways leading 
up to ADHD, nor the neurochemical pathways through which methylphenidate 
and similar stimulant medications exert their positive effects on deficient 
neurobiological pathways are well-known [40, 41]. However, the justification 
for using stimulant medication is straightforward: “the medication works!” As 
Hawthorne [39] argues, physicians favoring neurobiochemicalization of the 
disease are clear in their reasoning: since ADHD is a morbid and potentially 
devastating condition, and given that medication works, why should one want to 
let children suffer unnecessarily? It is true that there is convincing evidence that 
psychostimulant medication is highly effective in the short-term reduction of the 
core symptoms of ADHD [39, 42]. This information is also communicated to the 
public, for example, via informative websites which often list medical treatment 
as the first and most common of the available therapies. Other therapies (such as 
behavioral parent training, behavioral classroom interventions, social skills 
training, dietary treatment, etc.) are also listed. However, usually, none of these 
get as much support as the treatment by stimulant medication.  
 
Effective treatability drives physicians and researchers, as well as parents 
and school teachers, to support the neurobiochemicalization of ADHD. An 
effective treatment is, in this case, expected to lead to a short-term and profound 
change in what is perceived as a child’s misbehavior. Pharmacological treatment 
makes an easy intervention possible, in this case, even without a detailed 
account of the causation of the disease. Even if one holds the uncommon view 
that ADHD should primarily be explained by reference to the peculiarities of our 
modern society14—rather than situating the most important causes of the disease 
in the suffering individuals themselves—the epistemic interest in an effective 
short-term intervention can form a valid pragmatic argument for preferring to 
intervene at the lower level.15 Indeed, reducing the causes of ADHD seems to 
make it more easily “treatable,” which can be a first and well-considered 
epistemic interest of the researchers and physicians involved. A related 
epistemic motivation underlying neurobiochemical reduction might be 
parsimony: the neurobiochemical reduction is more parsimonious (proposing a 
one-pill-fits-all treatment) than non-reductive explanations that invoke child-
specific, customized behavioral (or even family) therapies.  
 
Hence, we agree that well-considered epistemic goals can be justified 
motives for choosing to adopt a reductive approach in treating ADHD. 
                                                
14 This would suggest that prevention of the disease should involve changes at these higher levels.  
15 Hence, arguing for the primacy of the sociocultural explanation does not automatically entail the denial of 
reductionist aspects in the etiology of the disease. However, the importance of the reductionist aspects for 
prevention and intervention, for example, can be discussed and the weight given to them can differ depending on 
the context.  
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However, the ADHD case also demonstrates that it is pertinent to ask whether it 
is not just generalized and unfounded methodologically reductive 
presuppositions rather than well-considered epistemic goals that often guide us 
towards reductionism in medicine. Merely the conviction that (still to be found) 
neurobiochemical problems cause the disease16—for example, on the basis that 
the medication seems to work17—is then treated as a sufficient justification for a 
reductive approach; but it is doubtful that such convictions are in fact sufficient. 
Another pertinent question is to what extent unjustified epistemic interests guide 
research and practice towards a reductive approach. For example, the 
patentability of an explanation and remedy might play an important role. Would 
a researcher look for an explanation that can support the development of a 
patentable pill to cure a disease or look for a less lucrative, non-patentable 
method (e.g., physical exercise, healthy foods, and education) to prevent a 
disease? Also, simplicity might be, in some cases, an unjustified epistemic 
concern: focusing on a behavioral and social level intervention, rather than 
pharmacological treatments, means choosing the more difficult approach that 
will indeed be much more demanding of the time and effort of children, their 
parents, their teachers, etc. However, this in itself is not necessarily enough 
reason to prefer a reductive approach.18  
 
The emphasis on a reductive explanation leads to a denial of the lack of 
reasons to reduce the search for an explanation of ADHD to individual 
dysfunctions. After all, no convincing clues for such a reductive explanation 
have been found yet. Meanwhile, it leaves other important explanation-seeking 
questions aside. Does the mother’s lifestyle during pregnancy play a role in the 
onset of ADHD in the child? Does the child’s lifestyle play a role? Can changes 
                                                
16 The conviction that a reductive explanation will be found in the future and that such an explanation will 
support a reductive approach—rather than the fact that an actual reductive explanation justifies the reductive 
approach—seems to form a sufficient ground for medicine to base the bulk of the research and preferred 
treatments on these still to be found reductive explanatory factors, for example, in the case of ADHD. This 
contrasts sharply with, for example, the arguments given by Scheidt [43] for not translating the findings on 
psychological explanatory factors into clinical practice measures. His argument is the current lack of knowledge 
about the precise mechanisms whereby psychological issues cause or potentiate disease. In view of such 
arguments with respect to non-reductive causes, it is remarkable that knowledge of the precise mechanisms, 
whereby reductive elements cause or potentiate disease, is not always requested, for example, when 
administering stimulant drugs to treat ADHD.  
17 In fact, that stimulant medication could treat what we now know as ADHD was discovered before the 
addressed problematic behavior of children was actually conceptualized as a disease [44]. 
18 The relation between epistemic motivations and non-scientific interests is in any case interesting enough to be 
further explored. The role of non-scientific interests is discussed in Gannett [45, p. 370] with respect to 
geneticization: “The context in which genes are chosen as the best ‘handles’ among these parts are not just 
scientific and clinical but economic and political. Geneticization finds a friendly home in a society less and less 
willing to commit resources to solving complex social problems.… Genetically engineered solutions make 
private investors money; serious attempts to counter poverty, environmental degradation, and tobacco, alcohol, 
and drug addiction just costs taxpayers money. The appreciation of the pragmatic dimensions of genetic 
explanations, and hence their contingency, not only provides good reason to be sceptical of what geneticization 
has to offer but, by forcing attention to context, asks us to examine the aims, interests, and orientations that lie 
behind the choices that are being made.” 
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in society at large (e.g., in the way children are educated) make up for a change 
in the incidence of ADHD? Do Western societies have a higher incidence of 
ADHD than non-Western societies? If so, what can explain these differences? 
Gathering much more knowledge on such explanatory factors than we have now 
might lead to important insights with respect to preventive and non-
pharmacological treatment measures, making it possible to lower the number of 
children who need medication to treat their ADHD.     
 
In any case, it is true that the treatability of the disease through 
interventions at non-reductive levels seems much more cumbersome than 
pharmacological responses. Even people arguing against the reduction of the 
problem of ADHD realize this. For example, Brock and Fernette Eide [46] argue 
against our tendency to adapt the abilities of ADHD children to our expectations 
by means of medical treatment and plead for adapting our demands to the 
peculiarities of these children’s brains. Yet, they have to admit that  
 
Of course, such an approach—better chemistry through living—is 
more demanding than writing prescriptions for Ritalin. And we are not 
naïve enough to believe that every child will ever get access to the 
best brain-based teachers and therapists, or that parents will become 
experts in brain-based learning. Yet we do believe that the time has 
come to move beyond the behavioral approach, to lessen our 
dependence on pharmacotherapy, and to seek more precise ways to 
help struggling kids. [46, p. 59]  
 
To conclude, it is clear that scientists and physicians will often have a difficult 
job in weighing the pros and cons of a reductive approach. However, this is no 
argument for considering neurobiochemicalization to be the straightforward 
choice. Scientists and practitioners should at least think about what can 
potentially be won by an explanatory pluralist approach instead of a reductive 
approach. 
 
A genetic disease?  
 
Another important form of reduction in the medical sciences for which the 
justification is not always clear, is geneticization. Geneticization can be defined 
as “a process in which differences between individuals are reduced to their 
DNA codes” [cf. 47, p. 235]. One can distinguish strong geneticization from 
weak geneticization. The strong variant implies methodological reductionism: it 
presupposes that the reduction will shed a light on the comprehensive causal 
web that leads to a disease. This ends in viewing complex traits, such as cancer, 
schizophrenia and alcoholism, narrowly as “genetic diseases,” although other 
significant environmental and other “non-genetic” contributions have been 
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identified in the past and have explanatory relevance in view of certain 
epistemic interests. Earlier successes of finding the gene causing a trait or 
disease, for example, Huntington’s disease, have installed a traditional model of 
deterministic monocausality in the popular imagination. This model presupposes 
that for many traits and diseases, the determining gene could be found—rather 
than the gene(s) that is/are in some way involved in the development of a trait or 
disease. This led, among other things, to research looking for the gay gene [48]. 
Monocausality has made place for multicausality in the explanation of most 
traits nowadays, but the tendency to pay a lot of attention to genetic explanations 
is still present. However, while the strong variant of geneticization causes the 
term “geneticization” to have a pejorative undertone in the literature, 
geneticization is not necessarily negative as the following examples of weak 
geneticization demonstrate.  
 
Dekkers and Rikkert [49] have analyzed the research on Alzheimer’s 
disease. Their paper clearly illustrates how geneticization is at work in medical 
research. In their discussion of the causes of Alzheimer’s disease (AD), Dekkers 
and Rikkert present the complex causal web leading up to forms of AD—a web 
in which neurological and genetic factors figure. Moreover, the authors notice 
that the current definition and classification of AD does not mention any genetic 
factors [49, p. 278]. Notwithstanding this, they discuss two examples in which 
researchers do geneticize. The first example deals with a successful experience 
of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for early-onset AD, in which only V717L 
mutation-free embryos were implanted in a 30-year-old woman with no signs of 
AD but who carried the V717L mutation [50]. A second example refers to the 
injection—with mixed success—of genetically modified skin cells that produce 
a protein called nerve growth factor, which prevents cell death in the brain [51]. 
Dekkers and Rikkert defend the search for a genetic explanation by these 
authors19 by concluding that: “[d]octors and researchers in the above examples 
are interested in one particular causal factor that they can influence in order to 
prevent AD (case 1) or to relieve the symptoms of AD (case 2)” [49, p. 281; 
italics added].  
 
In terms of our framework for explanatory pluralism, Dekkers and Rikkert 
argue in their paper that the work of these scientists is driven by certain specific 
epistemic motivations that explain their choice. The specific epistemic 
motivations that can be met by reducing the complex trait to a lower level 
(DNA) explanation are (a) prevention (at the individual level) and (b) 
treatability (the relief of symptoms) via (c) decomposition and re-composition of 
                                                
19 Since scientists hardly justify their choice to search for an explanation at a certain level, it is not possible to 
figure out whether or not these (and other) scientists just follow a general tendency to try to reduce everything to 
the level of the genes, or whether their work is grounded in the conviction that their results will serve specified 
epistemic interests.  
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brain cells. Both surveys are based on a weak form of geneticization in which 
the reduction does not intend to shed a light on the comprehensive causal web or 
all of the causal connections involved. Weak geneticization does not imply 
methodological reductionism but hopes to find an adequate answer at the genetic 
level, addressing specific epistemic interests. The completeness of such an 
explanation depends on the adequacy of the answer to the explanation-seeking 
question rather than on some ideal explanatory text (invoking all—possible—
causes) involving all relevant levels.  
 
As stated above, the tendency to pay a lot of attention to the search for 
genetic explanations is still present. Much research in the biomedical sciences 
focuses on the role of genes. Often this tendency has been interpreted as a 
consequence of scientists subscribing (in official and public contexts) to the 
fundamental theory within molecular genetics which sees genes as the 
fundamental units responsible for guiding all basic life processes.20 However, 
since many philosophical arguments have been formulated against this theory 
[cf. 53, p. 90], why is it being upheld? One answer might be that scientists still 
believe in genetic determinism. Another, more plausible, answer is that so much 
biomedical research is centered on genes and DNA because it is believed that 
genes can be used as handles to manipulate biological processes; they are 
supposed to serve several epistemic interests better than “non-genetic” 
approaches do.21 Again, epistemic interests cause researchers to adopt a 
reductionistic approach.  
 
What is the upshot of all this? First, it should be clear that an explanatory 
pluralist approach is not compatible with strong geneticization but is compatible 
with weak geneticization, where the choice to geneticize is motivated by specific 
epistemic interests. Consequently, the question is not whether geneticization as 
such is justified but whether the effort invested in the search for a genetic 
                                                
20 The fundamental theory should be distinguished from the basic theory. While the basic theory is more modest 
in answering the question, “What do genes do?”—i.e., that they “code for” or “determine” the linear sequences 
in RNA molecules and polypeptides synthesized in the cell—the fundamental theory is bolder, claiming that 
genes are “fundamental” entities that “direct” the development and functioning of organisms by “producing” 
proteins that in turn regulate all the important cellular processes [52]. 
21 Cf. Keller [54], Waters [52, 53]. “In the case of molecular genetics, it is investigative pragmatics, not 
fundamental theorizing, that drives scientific research. The basic theory suffices to explain the investigative 
utility and results of gene-centered approaches. The fundamental theory is, in an important sense, epiphenomenal 
with respect to the design and implementation of gene-centered research. On this view, the role of the 
fundamental theory should be understood in Latourian terms… as a platform for rallying the troops and bringing 
resources to research endeavors. The design of the laboratory experiments and the reason why the experiments 
work, can be explained in terms of broad investigative strategies, the basic causal theory of molecular genetics, 
and the details of the experimental contexts” [52, sec. 6]. Lisa Gannett [45], too, explains the increasing 
geneticization as driven by pragmatic dimensions, especially manipulability: “[the change brought about by 
geneticization] lies not in using newly acquired technological prowess to confirm the truth of long standing 
suspicions about the primacy of genes. I suggest, instead, that we understand geneticization in pragmatic terms: 
the increasing focus on genes as causes mirrors the increasing ability to manipulate DNA in the laboratory and in 
the clinic in furtherance of what are perceived to be desirable ends” [45, p. 369-370].  
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explanation is justified in these and other specific cases, given the epistemic 
interests that were supposed to be served. Hence, the crucial question that 
practitioners, researchers and funding agencies should pose becomes, what are 
the epistemic interests we want to serve, and given these epistemic interests, is 
the genetic level the level where we can reasonably hope to find the most 
adequate and accurate explanations? Whether or not one should answer the latter 
part of the question in the affirmative cannot be evaluated from a general stance 
towards geneticization but should be considered on a case-by-case basis. In any 
case, it is clear that not all medical researchers are convinced that the epistemic 
value of genetic research into the causes of disease is always well-considered: 
 
 The quest for understanding complex diseases, attitudes or behaviors by 
scrutinizing genes severely distorts not merely psychological and social 
issues, but biological ones as well. While human societies, psyches, and 
bodies have to be compatible with our genes, much as they have to be 
compatible with the subatomic particles constituting matter, it does not 
follow that genetics or quantum physics will provide an “instruction book 
for human biology…,” much less illuminate anything interesting about the 
human condition. Further research should investigate how the genetic 
paradigm exerts its fascination on intellectuals themselves. Failure to 
challenge it on its own term matters because it leaves beliefs about its 
“potential” (or its imagined dangers) alive, legitimizing claims that grab 
the collective imagination and driving resources away from urgently 
needed social, economic, and public health policies. [29, p. 1739] 
 
What Chaufan actually argues here—if translated to our framework—is that 
focusing on genes as explanatory factors, at the expense of other explanatory 
factors, often does not provide the adequate, efficient, and accurate answers to 
the rudimentary explanation-seeking questions that are used as a basis for this 
research into genes. Rather, she argues, this focus on genes distracts the 
attention from the search for non-reductive explanations, which are important 
because of the pressing epistemic needs of society. To conclude, it is an 
important task for medicine to consider thoroughly whether its inclination to 
attach great importance to research into genetic explanatory factors is always 
justified.  
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Cogent reasons clearly exist for preferring a reductive approach in certain 
medical contexts, given certain interests and goals. However, no reason exists to 
assume that a reductive approach is always the most adequate, efficient, and 
accurate. That is why we argued that methodological reductionism should be 
rejected as a regulative ideal for medicine. The same holds for methodological 
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non-reductionism and methodological holism: while convincing reasons do exist 
to search for, and make use of, non-reductive explanations in certain medical 
contexts, no reason exists to assume that a non-reductive or holistic approach 
will always deliver adequate, efficient, and accurate answers to our rudimentary 
explanation-seeking why-questions. Hence, all kinds of medical explanations 
generally have potential pragmatic value, but none of them have pragmatic value 
in every explanatory context. Different specific epistemic interests in different 
explanatory contexts will lead to different kinds of explanation-seeking 
questions, thus leading to different kinds of explanations. That is why we are 
convinced that explanatory pluralism holds for medicine.  
 
Nonetheless, methodological reductionism is still dominant in medicine; 
therefore, as our examples demonstrate, medical researchers and practitioners 
seem to presuppose too easily and too often that the rudimentary explanation-
seeking why-question can only be answered adequately in reductive terms. 
Although medicine slowly shows more interest in non-reductive explanations 
nowadays, it still has a long way to go to become fully and truly explanatory 
pluralist in practice. However, achieving the right balance will be a difficult 
exercise for the medical sciences.  
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